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Abstract
A lowest unique bid auction allocates a good to the agent who submits the lowest
bid that is not matched by any other bid. This peculiar auction format is becoming
increasingly popular over the Internet. We show that when all the bidders are rational
such a selling mechanism can lead to positive prots only if there is a large mismatch
between the auctioneers and the bidders valuation. On the contrary, the auction
becomes highly lucrative if at least some bidders are myopic. In this second case,
we analyze the key role played by the existence of some private signals that the seller
sends to the bidders about the status of their bids. Data about actual auctions conrm
the protability of the mechanism and the limited rationality of the bidders.
JEL Classication: D44, C72.
Keywords: Lowest unique bid auctions; Signals; Bounded rationality.
1 Introduction
A new wave of websites is intriguing consumers over the Internet. These websites sell
goods of considerable value (electronic equipment, watches, holidays, and even cars and
houses) through quite a peculiar auction mechanism: the winner is the bidder who submits
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the lowest unique o¤er, i.e., the lowest o¤er that is not matched by any other bid. Such a
mechanism is commonly called a lowest unique bid auction (LUBA) and leads to impres-
sively low selling prices; one of these websites reports that an iPod (value 200 Euros) has
been sold for 0.25 Euros, a Sony Playstation 3 (400 e) for 0.81 e, and a new Volkswagen
Beetle Cabriolet (32,000 e) for 32.83 e. These are not exceptions. As a rule of thumb,
goods are usually sold for a price that is 0.1-0.3% of the market value.
Websites o¤ering LUBAs rst appeared in Scandinavian countries in early 2006. Since
then, they rapidly developed in many other European countries (France, Germany, Hol-
land, Italy, Spain, and the UK). Word of mouth is fast, and this auction format is gaining
increasing media attention. Some people say LUBAs are a game of strategy; some say they
are just a lottery, but some suspect they are a plain scam. In this paper, we contribute to
this debate by studying this selling mechanism from a game theoretic point of view.
Let us introduce in more detail the functioning of a LUBA. As a rst step, agents
must register to one of these websites and transfer an amount of money of their choice to
a personal deposit. Users can then browse through the items on sale and submit as many
bids as they want on the items in which they are interested. Bids are expressed in cents
and are private. Every time that a user places a bid, a xed amount of money (typically
2 Euros) is deducted from his deposit. The auctioneer justies this cost as a price for
a (compulsory) packet of information that he sends to the bidder. In fact, as soon as
a bid is submitted, the user receives one of the three following messages: 1) Your bid is
currently the unique lowest bid; 2) Your bid is unique but is not the lowest; or 3) Your
bid is not unique. During the bidding period, which usually lasts for a few days, users can
at any time log in to their account in order to check the current status of their bids, to
add new ones, or to rell the deposit. Once the auction closes, the object is sold to the
bidder who submitted the lowest unique bid. For instance, if agents A and B o¤er 1 cent,
C o¤ers 2 cents, A and D o¤er 3 cents, and E o¤ers 6 cents, then the object is sold to C
for a price of 2 cents.
This allocation mechanism is, therefore, considerably di¤erent with respect to tradi-
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tional auction formats.1 In particular, it is the requirement about the uniqueness of the
winning bid that represents a novelty. On one hand, this requirement undermines key
objectives that lie at the core of standard auction theory like, for instance, the e¢ ciency
of the nal allocation. On the other hand, it adds some new strategic elements. In fact,
from a strategic point of view, a LUBA is more similar to other well-known games than
to a standard auction. Given that agents want to outguess the rivals, the game has some-
thing in common with the Guessing Game (Nagel, 1995). There is an important di¤erence
though. In the Guessing Game, the pattern of best responses follows a unique direction.
This does not happen in a lowest unique bid auction. In fact, a player that expects all the
opponents to bid 1 cent maximizes his payo¤ by bidding 2 cents. But if the player expects
all the opponents to bid 2 cents, then he should switch back and bid 1 cent. Therefore,
the game is not dominance solvable. On the other hand, some other features of the game
(the possibility of multiple bidding, a xed cost for each bid, and instantaneous knowledge
of the bidsstatus) makes it similar to a War of Attrition (Maynard Smith, 1974). But
the closest relative of the lowest unique bid auction is the Dollar Auction Game (Shubik,
1971). This is a public auction in which the prize (say, one dollar) is won by the highest
bidder, but both he and the second highest bidder must pay their bids. When participants
are not fully rational, this game can lead to some paradoxical results that highly reward
the auctioneer. We will see that something analogous can easily happen in the case of
LUBAs.
Apart from these classical contributions, there are also some very recent papers that
explicitly study various versions of unique bid auctions. Houba et al. (2009) and Rapoport
et al. (2009) analyze the equilibria of a LUBA in which bidders submit a unique bid,
there is a non-negative bidding fee, and the winner pays his bid. Both papers nd that
in the symmetric mixed equilibrium, bidders randomize with decreasing probabilities over
a support that comprises the lowest possible bid and is made of consecutive numbers.2
Östling et al. (2009) obtain a similar result for what they call a LUPI (Lowest Unique
1See Klemperer (1999) or Krishna (2002) for detailed reviews of standard auction theory.
2Rapoport et al. (2009) also analyze HUBAs, i.e., unique bid auctions in which the winner is the bidder
who submits the highest unmatched o¤er. Such a mechanism is also studied by Raviv and Virag (2009).
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Positive Integer) game in which players can again submit a single bid, but there are
no bidding fees, and the winner does not have to pay his bid. The peculiarity of this
study is that the number of participants is unknown and is assumed to follow a Poisson
distribution. Finally, Eichberger and Vinogradov (2008) analyze a LUBA (that they call
LUPA, i.e., Least Unmatched Price Auction) where bidders can submit multiple costly
bids, and the winner must pay his winning bid. Given that no information about other
biddersbehavior is released during the auction, they model the game as a simultaneous
game. For some special ranges of the parameters, they show the existence of a unique Nash
equilibrium in which agents mix over bidding strings that comprise the minimum allowed
bid and are made of consecutive numbers. In addition to the theoretical analysis, the
papers by Houba et al. (2009) and by Rapoport et al. (2009) propose some algorithms for
computing the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. The papers by Östling et al. (2009)
and Eichberger and Vinogradov (2008) have instead an empirical part, which is based on
eld and/or experimental data. Theoretical predictions nd some empirical evidence at
the aggregate level but a much lower one at the individual level.
With respect to this ongoing literature, our paper di¤ers in a number of ways. The main
novelty is the analysis of the role played by the signals that the bidders receive about the
status of their submitted bids. We study how these signals inuence the bidding strategies,
and we show them to be a key element of the mechanism, especially for what concerns
out of equilibrium play. Second, we explicitly model biddersdecisions about how much
to invest in the auction (i.e., how many bids to submit). We frame the problem as a
rent-seeking game, and we study how the optimal level of investment is inuenced by the
parameters of the game. Finally, by modeling LUBAs as a sequential game that captures
the actions of both the bidders and the auctioneer, we focus on the protability of the
mechanism. We show that if agents are rational then the expected prots of the auctioneer
can be positive only if his valuation of the good is (much) lower than the valuation of the
bidders. This would imply that websites o¤ering LUBAs should not proliferate the way
they do. We then adopt a more behavioral approach and show how a LUBA can become
highly protable when at least some of the bidders lack the necessary commitment to
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stick to equilibrium strategies. The protability of this selling mechanism and the limited
rationality of the bidders nd an empirical conrmation in the analysis of a dataset that
collects information about actual LUBAs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formalizes the strategic
situation and characterizes its equilibria under the assumption of perfect rationality of
the players. Section 3 investigates what happens when some of the bidders are boundedly
rational. Section 4 examines a dataset, which collects detailed information about 100
LUBAs. Section 5 concludes.
2 The game and its equilibria
We introduce and analyze a sequential game that captures some of the key features of a
lowest unique bid auction. The game spans over T + 2 periods with t 2 f 1; 0; 1; :::; Tg
and has (N + 1) risk-neutral players: an auctioneer (a) and N  2 symmetric potential
buyers. We assume that N is known. At period t =  1 the auctioneer, whose outside
option is ua = 0, can decide to auction a certain good through a LUBA. We indicate with
Va the value of the good for the auctioneer and with V the homogeneous valuation of
any potential buyer i 2 N . We assume that Va  V .3 If a opens the auction he credibly
commits to sell the good to the buyer who o¤ers the lowest positive bid that is not matched
by any other bid. The N buyers must then solve two distinct and subsequent problems.
In the rst one, which takes place at t = 0 and which we label the investment decision,
each agent decides the maximum amount that he is willing to invest in the game. Given
that each bid costs c 2 [1; V   1], this amount determines the number of bids that the
agent is willing to submit throughout the game. In the second problem, which we label
the bidding phase", each bidder must decide where and when to place these bids. The
bidding phase starts at t = 1 (the opening of the auction) and ends at t = T (the closing
of the auction) where T is common knowledge. At any period t 2 f1; :::; Tg each player i
plays xti 2 fg [ f1; :::;1g. Action xti =  indicates that agent i does not bid at period
3V can be interpreted as the retail price of the good. The assumption Va  V captures the fact that
the auctioneer may pay the good less than its retail price because of quantity discount and/or marketing
reasons.
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t. Action xti 6=  indicates that agent i submits at time t the bid xti 2 f1; :::;1g. As soon
as a bid xti 6=  has been placed, player i is charged c and receives from the auctioneer a
truthful and private signal t
 
xti
 2 fW;M;Lg. It is common knowledge that the signals
mean the following:
 t  xti = W indicates that xti is currently the W inning bid (i.e., at time t xti is the
lowest unique bid).
 t  xti =M indicates that xti M ight be the winning bid (i.e., at time t xti is unique
but it is not the lowest).
 t  xti = L indicates that xti is a Losing bid (i.e., xti is not unique).
The status of some bids can thus change over time. In particular, the signal t
 
xti

=
W can be updated by s
 
xti

= M (a bidder j places at time s 2 ft+ 1; :::; Tg the bid
xsj < x
t
i such that 
s (xsi ) = W ) or by 
s
 
xti

= L (a bidder j bids xsj = x
t
i). For similar
reasons the signal t
 
xti

= M can be updated by s
 
xti

= W or by s
 
xti

= L. The
signal t
 
xti

= L cannot be updated as the status of a bid that is not unique cannot
change any more. If at period t a unique bid does not exist then a specic tie-breaking
rule ensures that a single bid receives the signal W .4 In other words, there is always a
bidder who holds the provisional winning bid and this bidder is unique. Each bidder can
check the current status of his own bids at any time and at no cost.
In order to formalize playerspayo¤s we let ti 2 N be the number of bids submitted by
agent i up to period t such that Ti is the number of bids submitted by i over the course
of the entire auction

i.e., the cardinality of the set

xti j xti 6= 
	T
t=1

. Moreover we use
the notation x^ti to indicate the bid that wins the auction. Stressing that all the monetary
values

Va; V; c and

xti
	T
t=1
for all i

are expressed in the same unit (say Euro cents),
payo¤s take the following form:
ua =
8<:
P
i2N 
T
i c+ x^
t
i   Va if a opens the LUBA
0 otherwise
4The rule species that if at time t 2 f1; :::; Tg a unique o¤er does not exist, then the current winner is
the bidder that submitted rst the lowest bid chosen by the lowest number of agents. We add the further
rule that if two or more agents chose this bid simultaneously then the tie is broken randomly.
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ui =
8<: V   Ti c  x^ti if 9x^ti 2

xti
	T
t=1
s.t. T
 
x^ti

=W
 Ti c otherwise
for i 2 N
Notice that the payo¤s of the bidders comprise their outside option of not participating
to the auction as ui = 0 when Ti = 0.
We solve the game by backwards induction. Therefore, we rst analyze the bidding
phase of the game. Then, we study the investment decision of the bidders. Finally, we
examine the decision of the auctioneer if to open or not the LUBA.
2.1 The bidding phase
Let max 2 N be the maximum number of bids that a rational bidder is willing to submit
in the LUBA. Section 2.2 will provide a rationale for such a formulation, explicitly derive
max as a function of the parameters of the game and show that max is symmetric. By
now, we take max as given with max  1. Bidders must then choose when and where to
place their bids. In what follows, we investigate these problems.
We di¤erentiate between two cases: max = 1 and max > 1. The second situation is
obviously more complex as bidders must condition their behavior on their former bids and
on the associated signals. Still, the two cases share some common features. First, in both
situations an equilibrium surely exists. In fact, the number of players is nite and so is their
strategy space once that strictly dominated bids are eliminated, i.e., xti 2 f1; :::; V   cg
rather than xti 2 f1; :::;1g. Indeed, it is easy to notice that equilibria actually abound.
In particular, there exist a large number of asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies.5
However, given the symmetry and the anonymity of the bidders, we restrict our attention
to symmetric equilibria. Symmetric equilibria in pure strategies cannot exist: bidders
want to outguess the rivals such that for any N > 2 a protable deviation surely exists
from any symmetric pure strategy prole. It follows that a symmetric equilibrium must
necessarily involve mixed strategies.
As for the timing dimension of the game, we assume T >> max such that agents
have enough periods to use all their available bids if so they wish. This assumption is
5For example, if N = 3 and max = 1 the proles

x1i = 1; x
1
j = 1; x
1
k = 2
	
and

x1i = 1; x
1
j = 2; x
1
k = 3
	
are Nash equilibria as there are no (strictly) protable deviations.
7
not particularly restrictive given that in actual LUBAs the bidding period lasts for a few
days while the time needed to submit a bid amounts to a few seconds. Moreover, the tie-
breaking rule (see footnote 4) implies that all those strategies in which bidders delay the
submission of their bids are weakly dominated. By invoking a trembling hand argument
we disregard these strategies and we focus on the equilibria in which bidders place their
bids as soon as possible.
2.1.1 The case with max = 1
The case with max = 1 is analogous to a LUBA in which the rules of the auction specify
that each player can submit a single bid. This situation has been carefully investigated by
Houba et al. (2009) and Rapoport et al. (2009). In line with their ndings, the following
proposition describes some features of the equilibrium distribution.
Proposition 1 In the symmetric equilibrium of the LUBA with max = 1, each bidder
chooses x1i according to the distribution p such that:
(i) p has support S(p) = f1; :::;Kg with K  V   c.
(ii) p(x) is strictly decreasing in x.
Proof. Assume that there exists an equilibrium in which p(k) = 0 for some k 2 f1; :::;Kg
but p() > 0 for  > k. Then pure strategy x1i =  would be strictly dominated by
strategy x1i = k. This implies that  should not be played in the mixed equilibrium, a
negation of the initial assumption. Therefore, the support of the distribution comprises 1
and has no gaps. The fact that K  V   c follows from elimination of strictly dominated
bids. As for the second point, assume that in equilibrium the probability distribution is
non strictly decreasing and there exists at least a  2 S(p) for which p()  p(k) with
k 2 f1; :::;   1g. Then E  uijx1i = k > E  uijx1i = . In fact, either x1i = k is more
likely to be unique than x1i =  (the case with p() > p(k)) or x
1
i =  and x
1
i = k are
equally likely to be unique (the case with p() = p(k)). But in both cases x1i = k is
more likely to result into the lowest unique bid simply because k < . Moreover with
x1i = k the price that the bidder must pay if he wins is lower than with x
1
i = . But
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E
 
uijx1i = k

> E
 
uijx1i = 

contradicts the fact that both k and  are in the support
of p(x). For this to be the case E
 
uijx1i = k

= E
 
uijx1i = 

must hold which requires
p() < p(k) in order to balance the advantages of bidding on k. By setting  = k+ 1 and
k 2 f1; :::;K   1g this result must hold for any pair of consecutive numbers in S(p). It
follows that p(x) is strictly decreasing in x 2 f1; :::;Kg.
In the symmetric equilibrium all the bidders mix according to p. It follows that every
player is equally likely to win. Signals do not matter in this context: each bidder receives
the signal 1(x1i ) 2 fW;M;Lg but, given max = 1, he does not have any additional bid
to submit. Therefore xti =  for any i and any t 2 f2; :::; Tg and T (x1i ) = 1(x1i ) for any
i.
2.1.2 The case with max > 1
If max > 1, bidders can submit multiple bids. Because of the tie-breaking rule, every
bidder submits his rst bid at t = 1. And given that bids are costly, agents place their
rst bid x1i in the optimal way, i.e., by using the probability distribution that characterizes
the equilibrium when max = 1 (see Proposition 1). We now label this distribution p1
where the superscript indicates that this is the distribution from which agents draw their
rst bid. Bidders then receive the signal 1(x1i ) 2 fW;M;Lg and can decide if to submit
additional bids. Who will do so? The following two lemmas answer this question.
Lemma 1 For any t  1, there exist N   1 bidders for which t (xri ) 6= W for every
element of the set fxri gtr=1.
Proof. The rules of the game ensures that, for any t  1 and any possible distribution
of bids, there is a unique bidder j who submitted the unique bid x^rj 2
n
xrj
ot
r=1
for which
t

x^rj

=W . It follows that the remaining N 1 bidders do not hold the current winning
bid, i.e., t (xri ) 6=W for every element of the set fxri gtr=1 and for any i 6= j.
Lemma 2 For any t  1 and any bidder i, xti 6=  if and only if t 1i < max and
t 1 (xri ) 6=W for every element of the set fxri gt 1r=1. Otherwise xti = .
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Proof. max is the maximum number of bids that a rational bidder is willing to submit.
It is derived (see section 2.2) as the optimal solution to the investment decision agents
face at t = 0. It follows tautologically that a player who does not hold the current winning
bid keeps on submitting bids until ti = 
max. On the other hand, a bidder who holds the
bid x^ri 2 fxri gt 1r=1 for which t 1 (x^ri ) = W does not submit additional bids given that,
conditional on T (x^ri ) = W , his payo¤ is higher with 
T
i = 
t 1
i < 
max. And if the
signal t 1 (x^ri ) = W is updated by 
t 1+k (x^ri ) 6= W then the agent still has the option
to submit the remaining max   t 1i bids given the assumption T >> max.
Therefore, every agent that does not hold the current winning o¤er and that did not
reach the upper bound t 1i = 
max keeps submitting additional bids. These subsequent
bids are clearly not independent. In fact, not only a rational agent will not submit the
same bid more than once but he will also condition his bidding strategy on the signals he
receives from the auctioneer. Proposition 2 describes how a rational player updates the
probability distribution pti from which he draws x
t
i. Notice the subscript i attached to this
distribution. This indicates that, while p1i = p
1 for any i, subsequent distributions may
di¤er across bidders. In equilibrium, bidders with an identical history of bids and signals
use identical distributions while bidders who submitted di¤erent bids and/or received
di¤erent signals randomize according to di¤erent distributions.
Proposition 2 For any t > 1, a bidder i for which xti 6=  chooses xti according to pti
where pti is such that:
(i) S(pti) =
nn
1; :::;min
n
xri   1jt 1 (xri ) =M
	t 1
r=1
[ fKg
oo
nxri jt 1 (xri ) = L	t 1r=1o
(ii) pti(x) is strictly decreasing in x for x 2 S(pti)
(iii) pti is derived from p
t 1
i according to Bayess rule.
Proof. The fact that a player must exclude from the support the bids that he already
submitted and whose associated signal is t 1 (xri ) = L is obvious. Similarly, the upper
bound of the support must be updated with the predecessor of the smallest bid whose
associated signal is t 1 (xri ) =M . In fact such a signal implies that the current winning
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bid lies somewhere between 1 and xri   1. The bidder must bid in this interval in order to
either match the current winning bid (hoping to get t (xri ) =W ) or to nd a new lowest
unique bid. The proof that pti(x) is strictly decreasing over S(p
t
i) is analogous to the proof
of Proposition 2. The fact that players update the probability distribution according to
Bayess rule directly derives from the assumption of rational behavior.
2.2 The investment decision
Bidders accumulate sunk costs at rate c > 0 for every bid they submit. Before the
beginning of the bidding phase (i.e., at t = 0), a rational bidder must then set an upper
bound on the amount of money he is willing to invest in the game.6 This immediately
determines the maximum number of bids the agent can submit. We indicate this number
with maxi 2 N. The return on the investment maxi c is uncertain given that, as we saw, the
outcome of a LUBA is non deterministic. The bidder must then trade-o¤ the probability of
winning the LUBA with the losses he su¤ers in case he does not win. The agent optimally
solves this trade-o¤ by maximizing his expected utility E0(ui). By rearranging the payo¤s
introduced in section 2, the agents problem can be expressed as:
max
maxi
E0(ui) =
 
V   x^ti

Pi   maxi c (1)
where Pi is the probability that at period t = T bidder i holds the bid x^ti 2

xti
	T
t=1
such
that T
 
x^ti

=W . Given that in the symmetric equilibrium (see section 2.1), each bidder
i chooses where to place his bids xti 6=  according to a symmetric mixed strategy, it follows
that all the players are ex-ante equally likely to win if they all submit the same number
of bids. But it is also true that a bidder who submits more bids than his opponents has
better chances to win the LUBA. In other words, Pi depends on the relative levels of
investment of the players i. More formally, Pi = Pi(!1; :::!N ) where !i = maxi c is the
investment (or e¤ort) chosen by agent i.
Now let !i 2 R+ and x^ti ! 0. The rst assumption transforms the problem from a
6 In particular, the agent must perform some sort of worst-case scenario analysis and ask himself: In
case I receive the signal t (xri ) 6=W for every bid xri that I submit, when shall I stop?
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discrete one to a continuous one such that calculus techniques can be applied. The second
assumption implies that at t = 0 agents do not consider that they will also have to pay x^ti
in case they win. We already mentioned that x^ti is negligible with respect to V (around
0:1 0:3%) and thus unlikely to really a¤ect the investment decision at t = 0.7 With these
two assumptions, (1) is strategically equivalent to:
max
!i
E0(ui) = V Pi(!1; :::!N )  !i (2)
This last formulation expresses the investment decision of a LUBA as a symmetric
rent-seeking game, i.e., a probabilistic contest in which players compete for a prize by
expending costly resources.8 To nd the optimal solution to the agents problem we still
need to specify a functional form for the success function Pi(!1; :::!N ). Given all the
possible histories of bids and signals that agents can get, a precise characterization of such
a function appears to be a daunting task. We thus look for a tractable approximation that
may satisfy 5 fundamental properties.
P1) Pi = 0 if !i = 0
P2) Pi = 1 if
P
j 6=i !j = 0 and !i > 0
P3) Pi = 1N if !i = !j for all j
P4) @Pi@!i > 0,
@Pi
@!j
< 0
P5) @
2Pi
@!2i
> 0, @
2Pi
@!2j
< 0
The rst three properties dene the limits of Pi and impose symmetry. P4 captures
the fact that in a LUBA an agent who invests more (i.e., submit more bids) has a higher
probability of winning. P5 requires increasing returns to scale for the marginal bid. In
equilibrium in fact (see Proposition 2), the support of the distribution from which a bidder
draws the bid xti shrinks as a result of the signals

t 1(xri )
	t 1
r=1
2 fM;Lg associated with
the agents previous bids. In particular, while the signal L eliminates from the support a
7A similar approach has been used by Raviv and Virag (2009) for what concerns HUBAs.
8Rent-seeking games are used to model a wide spectrum of phenomena that involve political lobbying,
investment in R&D activities, lotteries. See Tullock (1980), Baye et al. (1994), Kooreman and Schoonbeek
(1997) and Baye and Hoppe (2003).
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unique value, the signal M eliminates an entire string of values. Therefore, the signal M
increases more than proportionally the probability of nding the lowest unique bid. And
given that the probability of submitting a bid that receives the signal M increases with
the number of bids, it follows that the probability of winning a LUBA increases more than
proportionally with the e¤ortthe agent exerts.
A success function that satises all the 5 properties is the famous Tullock function
(Tullock, 1980): Pi =
!Ri
!Ri +
P
j 6=i !
R
j
. The parameter R captures the returns to scale that
the investment !i has on the probability of winning. In order to capture the increasing
returns to scale postulated by P5 we set R > 1.9 With this specication, (2) becomes:
max
!i
E0(ui) =
!Ri
!Ri +
P
j 6=i !
R
j
V   !i (3)
The following proposition solves (3) by trivially generalizing the analysis of Baye et al.
(1994) from the 2 players case to the N players case.
Proposition 3 Let ! 2 R+ and x^ti ! 0, then the investment decision of a lowest unique
bid auction with N bidders has solution ! = N 1
N2
V R with R 2

1; NN 1

.
Proof. In the appendix.
In line with what intuition suggests, ! is increasing in V and R and decreasing in
N . The optimal ! uniquely determines the maximum number of bids that an agent is
willing to submit. In fact, introducing the ooroperator bc such that bzc maps the real
number z into the integer n with n  z < n+ 1, we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 3 In the symmetric LUBA, each bidder submits up to max bids with max =
!
c

=

N 1
N2c
V R

.
9 If R = 1 the problem becomes a standard (Tullock) lottery in which the probability of winning linearly
increases with the investment. On the other hand, as R ! 1 the game approaches an all-pay auction in
which the agent that invests more wins for sure. Both specications are clearly unsuitable to model the
success function of a LUBA.
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Proof. Each bid costs c. It follows that !c is the number of bids an agent would submit
if these were perfectly divisible. But the number of bids must be an integer such that
max =

!
c

. This is the maximum number of bids an agent is willing to submit: bidders
payo¤ is decreasing in Ti such that, for any given outcome of the game, an agent is strictly
better o¤ with Ti < 
max.
The integer max is a weakly increasing function of ! such that the maximum number
of bids that an agent is willing to submit in a LUBA weakly increases with the agents
valuation V and the returns to scale R and weakly decreases with the number of partici-
pants N and the bidding fee c. Lemma 3 implies that max  1, such that all the bidders
enter for sure, whenever V  N2c(N 1)R . In other words, the value of the auctioned good
must be high enough to compensate for the number of participants and the cost of the
bidding fee.10 If max = 1 the analysis of section 2.1.1 applies. If max > 1, section 2.1.2
is the relevant one.
2.3 The auctioneers decision
From the point of view of the auctioneer, the decision of opening the LUBA depends on
the expected prots that the mechanism can raise. We show these expected prots to
be bounded below. Therefore, the auctioneer certainly opens the auction whenever this
bound is positive. Proposition 4 formalizes this result while Example 1 explicitly solves
an hypothetical LUBA.
Proposition 4 The auctioneer surely opens the LUBA if Va < ((N   1)max + 1) c+ 1.
Proof. The auctioneers outside option is 0. In case he opens the LUBA his prots are
given by ua =
P
i2N 
T
i c+ x^
t
i   Va. Because of Lemma 2, in equilibrium the N   1 losing
bidders submit max bids while the winning bidder submits at least one bid. Moreover
the lowest possible winning bid is 1 cent. It follows that ua is bounded below by umina =
10Despite a totally di¤erent modelling strategy this result is in line with Houba et al. (2009) and
Rapoport et al. (2009) that also show that full entry does not occur if N or c are too high or V is too low.
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((N   1)max + 1) c+1 Va which is strictly positive for any Va < ((N   1)max + 1) c+1.
Example 1 Consider a LUBA for an item for which V = 10; 000 (i.e., 100 e), c = 200
and N = 10 such that R 2  1; 109 . These parameters imply max = N 1N2c V R = 4 for any
R. Auctioneers prots are bounded below by umina = ((36 + 1)  200) + 1   Va such that
umina > 0 for any Va < 7; 401. It follows that the auctioneer certainly opens the LUBA if
he pays the good no more than 74% of its retail price.
It is interesting to compare auctioneers prots with the prots that the mecha-
nism would raise if signals were not available. Prots with signals are given by ua 2 
(N   1)max + Ti

c+ x^ti   Va
	max
Ti =1
where Ti indicates the number of bids submit-
ted by the winning bidder. Prots without signals would amount to ua(nosignals) =
Nmaxc+ x^ti Va because, with no feedbacks and in line with Lemma 3, all the N bidders
would submit their max available bids. Therefore, for any given x^ti, prots with signals
are (weakly) dominated by prots without signals. This consideration leads to question
why websites that organize LUBAs implement the mechanism with signals. Two are the
possible answers: either the auctioneer adopts a sub-optimal behavior or the bidders do
not play the game as equilibrium analysis indicates. Given that the rst option seems
unlikely, we now turn to analyze the second possibility.
3 The game with (some) boundedly rational bidders
The previous section showed that a lowest unique bid auction can be protable for the
seller even when all the bidders are rational and play the equilibrium strategies. Still,
a necessary condition for ensuring positive prots is the existence of a (possibly large)
mismatch between the retail price of the good (V ) and the auctioneers valuation (Va).
This nding, while interesting, hardly rationalizes what we observe in reality, namely the
continuous opening of websites that organize LUBAs. On the contrary, this trend suggests
that the business is much more protable than what equilibrium analysis indicates. In this
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section we relax the assumption of full rationality and we show how LUBAs can become
highly protable when some bidders lack the necessary commitment to stick to equilibrium
strategies.11 We show how these agents can get stuck into a costly war of attrition and
how this mechanism is triggered and amplied by the existence of the signals.
Given any max  1, let the LUBA proceed according to equilibrium analysis. Lemmas
1 and 2 imply that the auction reaches a certain period t in which N 1 bidders have used
all their available bids (t

i = 
max) and none of them holds the winning bid. Therefore
ut

i =  maxc. A rational bidder who committed to Ti  max (see Lemma 3) accepts this
loss. In other words, he plays xti =  for any t 2 ft + 1; :::; Tg such that uTi =  maxc.
However, a boundedly rational bidder may be tempted to submit additional bids hoping
to eventually win the auction and turn the sunk costs into a positive payo¤. We start by
better dening what we mean by boundedly rational behavior in the context of a LUBA.
Denition 1 Bidder i is boundedly rational if:
(i) whenever t (xri ) 6= W for every element of the set fxri gtr=1, he holds the probability
weighting function wti
 
qti

> qti  0 where qti = qti
 
xt+1i

is the probability that an addi-
tional bid xt+1i 6=  placed according to Proposition 2 will lead to the signal t+1 (x^ri ) =W
for some x^ri 2 fxri gt+1r=1;
(ii) he is myopic and believes that ut+1i = u
T
i ;
(iii) he lacks the commitment to stop at Ti = 
max.
At any time t, and out of the many possible distributions of actual bids, there are
certainly cases in which bidder i can conquer the winning bid by submitting an additional
o¤er. For example, if all the bidders bid 1 at t = 1 then x2i = 2 will receive the signal
2
 
x2i

= W . Therefore, the event of winning the auction with an extra bid has an
objective probability qti  0. However, for realistic values of N and max, this probability,
when positive, is certainly small. In line with prospect theory (Kanheman and Tversky,
1979) and the empirical evidence about probability weighting functions (see Prelec, 1998,
11A similar approach is adopted by Malmendier and Szeidl (2008) that show how the presence of a
minority of overbidding behavioral agents disproportionally inates prots in the case of standard auctions.
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and references within), a boundedly rational bidder overestimates this probability, i.e.,
wti
 
qti

> qti . Many are the well-known behavioral biases that can shape such a subjective
probability assessment: loss-aversion, over-optimism, wishful thinking, bidding fever. The
fact that wti
 
qti

> qti when q
t
i is small generates a classical pattern of risk attitudes,
namely risk-seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. This in turn
rationalizes widespread phenomena like the purchase of lottery tickets or disproportionate
betting on longshots. In the context of a LUBA this same pattern can lead to excessive
bidding as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 5 A boundedly rational bidder i for which t (xri ) 6=W for every element of
the set fxri gtr=1 and ti  max plays xt+1i 6=  if wti
 
qti

> cV x^ri '
c
V . Moreover if this
condition holds at time t then it also holds at time t + k such that xt+k+1i 6=  for any
k 2 f1; :::; T   t  1g whenever t+k (xri ) 6=W for every element of the set fxri gt+kr=1.
Proof. A boundedly rational bidder who does not hold the winning bid and is not commit-
ted to ti  max, submits an additional bid if E(ut+1i ) > uti, i.e., wti
 
qti
  
V    ti + 1 c  x^ri + 
1  wti
 
qti
     ti + 1 c >  tic where x^ri 2 fxri gt+1r=1 is is eventual winning bid. Solv-
ing for wti
 
qti

, the last condition is veried for any wti
 
qti

> cV x^ri '
c
V given that in
practice x^ri is negligible. With this approximation the lower bound for the probability
weighting function does not depend on ti and remains constant over time. This means
that if the constraint is satised at period t, it is also satised at any period t + k with
k 2 f1; :::; T   t  1g such that agent i keeps on submitting additional bids until he gets
the signal t+k (x^ri ) =W for some x^
r
i 2 fxri gt+kr=1.
Example 2 Consider the situation described in Example 1 with V = 10; 000, c = 200,
N = 10 and max = 4. Assume that there are at least 2  I  10 boundedly rational bidders
(Denition 1). At least I   1 of them reach at t the situation ti = 4 and t

(xri ) 6= W
for any xri 2

x1i ; :::; x
t
i
	
. Proposition 5 states that each one of these bidders submits an
additional bid at every t 2 ft + 1; :::; Tg whenever they do not hold the winning bid and
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their probability weighting function is such that wt

i
 
qt

i

> 20010;000 x^ri ' 0:02. Notice that
the constraint on wt

i
 
qt

i

is very low.
Example 2 implies that the presence of at least two boundedly rational bidders can
easily trigger a costly vicious circle in which these players accumulate sunk costs. An
upper bound to this process is given either by T (the closing of the auction) or by bidders
budget constraint. Whenever these limits are not binding, this sort of war of attrition can
continue even when the costs associated with the number of bids exceed the value of the
good on sale.
To see this, let A and B be two boundedly rational players with wti
 
qti

> cV for
i 2 fA;Bg. In line with Proposition 5, the auction will reach period ~t in which a bidder,
say A, is the current winner such that u~tA = V   ~tAc   x^rA > 0 with x^rA 2 fxrAg
~t
1 and
u~tB =  ~tBc. Still, one more bid of B can potentially lead to u~t+1B = V   (~tB + 1)c   x^rB
with x^rB 2 fxrBg
~t+1
1 but u
~t+1
B < 0. Agent B compares u
~t
B and u
~t+1
B . Both values are
negative. Nevertheless u~t+1B > u
~t
B such that, given the probability weighting function
wtB
 
qtB

> cV , agent B still prefers to play x
~t+1
B 6=  hoping to diminish his own losses.
The same argument holds for periods ~t + 1, ~t + 2, :::, T   1. Now assume that before
t = T   1, agent B conquers the winning bid. Bidder A would then sooner or later nd
himself in the situation in which B was at period ~t. Therefore, the same logic applies and
the mechanism perpetuates itself.
This feature of lowest unique bid auctions is reminiscent of the Dollar Auction Game
(Shubik, 1971). The Dollar Auction Game is a public ascending auction where N bidders
compete for a dollar. The auction is won by the agent who submits the highest bid but
both him and the second highest bidder must pay their bids. Also in this case, the auction
is unprotable for the seller if agents are rational. But if multiple entry occurs, this starts
o¤ a bidding war between the two leading bidders such that the winner may end up paying
the dollar more than what it is worth. Both in the Dollar Auction Game and in a LUBA,
the bidding escalation is detrimental for the bidders but benecial for the auctioneer. In
fact, as Morgan and Krishna (1997) show, war of attritions yield revenues that are superior
to standard auction mechanisms.
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Going back to the analysis of LUBAs, notice that the assumption of at least two
boundedly rational bidders is not su¢ cient to trigger the bidding escalation. It is in fact
the combination of boundedly rational behavior and of the existence of the signals that
accomplishes this task. To appreciate the fundamental role that signals play, consider how
di¤erent the situation would be if agents were not receiving any kind of feedback about the
status of their bids. In such a case, each player would hold the legitimate hope to win the
auction with one of his max bids such that the incentives to submit extra bids are much
weaker. And when at the closure of the auction the winner is declared, it would be too late
for the losers to submit additional o¤ers. In other words, in terms of ambiguity, a LUBA
without signals would resemble a traditional lottery. On the other hand, signals make the
game more similar to a scratch and win lottery. In fact, signals (and in particular the
signal L) immediately inform the bidder that some or all of his o¤ers have no chances to
win. This clearly encourages overbidding given that an agent that faces potential losses is
tempted to submit additional bids in order to catch up.
Quoting what Malmendier and Szeidl (2008) write with regards to standard auction
mechanisms if agents are subject to bidding fever, sellers may instigate this bias using
salient messages informing the buyer that he has been outbid. Indeed, the entire signal-
ing mechanism that characterizes LUBAs seems to have been designed with the goal of
stimulating emotional responses that may lead to an irrational escalation of commitment.
Given that the auctioneer aims to maximize the number of received bids, this obviously
comes as no surprise.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section we analyze a dataset that collects information about 100 lowest unique
bid auctions that took place in the period February 6th, 2008 - April 6th, 2008. These
auctions have been organized by the website bidplaza.it, the leader of the Italian market
with more than 1; 000; 000 contacts per month.12 The rules implemented by this auctioneer
12At the time the data were collected, bidplaza.it was operating as the italian subsidiary of bidster.com,
the world leader in the sector. In November 2008 this partnership broke down and since then both websites
independently o¤er LUBAs in Italy.
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are exactly the ones explained in the introduction. In particular the cost associated with
each bid was set at 2 Euros in every LUBA. For each auction we know the market value
of the item on sale, the winning bid and, most importantly, the complete list of submitted
bids. Overall, our dataset collects 100; 940 bids.13 Unluckily, we do not have information
about the number of bidders, how many and which bids each bidder submitted and the
signals they received. Nevertheless, the data allow to clearly distinguish some interesting
patterns as well as to discriminate between rational versus irrational bidding behavior.
Table 1 reports some summary statistics.
Variables average min max st. dev. sum
Retail price V (e) 274:90 80 450 96:1 27; 490
Winning bid (e) 0:89 0:01 3:37 0:66 88:66
Number of received bids 1; 009 119 2; 917 635 100; 940
Lower bound on number of bidders (N) 15:3 5 38 6:45
Max # of bids under rationality (#k (N

k )) 137:4 40 225 48:04 13; 740
Estimated prots (e) 1; 239:2 49 3; 975 893:1 123; 920
Estimated prots (% wrt retail price) 441% 19% 1; 082% 237%
Table 1. Some summary statistics of the data.
The rst three rows of Table 1 report some statistics about the retail price of the
auctioned items, the winning bids and the number of received bids. Not surprisingly,
there is a positive relationship between the retail price and the number of received bids
(Pearsons r = 0:645), as well as between the number of received bids and the winning bid
(r = 0:616).
13The dataset, which we manually assembled by retrieving the data from the website bidplaza.it (section
aste chiuse, i.e., expired auctions), is available upon request. This is the list of goods to which the data
refer (the notation y (V; k) indicates that good y whose retail price is V has been o¤ered in k di¤erent
auctions such that
P
y k = 100): Sony Playstation 3 (400; 10), Sony Playstation Portable Slim & Lite
(190; 10), Digital Camera IXUS 860IS (350; 9), iPod Shu­ e 1 GB (80; 7), iPod Nano 8 GB (200; 9), iPod
Touch 16 GB (400; 8), Bose Companion 3 multimedia speaker system (295; 10), Samsung CE 1070TS
microwawe oven (240; 9), Nintendo Wii (250; 10), Philips Digital PhotoFrame Wood 10FF2CWO (250; 4),
TomTom One V3 Portable GPS Navigation System (200; 9), XBOX 360 Elite (450; 5).
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The actual distribution of bids can be used to establish a lower bound for the number
of bidders. In fact, by assuming that no agent submitted more than once the same bid
in the same auction, the lower bound N can be inferred from the frequency of the most
frequent bid. This bound (N = 15:3) is extremely conservative and the actual number
of bidders is likely to be much higher than that. Nevertheless we can exclude a rational
bidding behavior no matter the real N . Equilibrium analysis (see Lemma 3) indicates in
fact that every LUBA k 2 f1; :::; 100g can raise at most #k bids with #k = Nkmaxk =
Nk
j
Nk 1
(Nk)
2c
VkR
k
with R 2

1; NkNk 1

. By letting R = NkNk 1 and substituting the specic
values of Vk and c we can thus solve #k as a function of Nk for Nk 2 fNk; :::;1g and
retrieve max#k = #k (Nk ) (fth row of Table 1). This is the maximum number of bids
auction k could have raised even assuming the most rewarding returns of scale R and
the most favorable number of bidders Nk .
14 The estimate of max#k falls short of the
actual number of received bids by a factor of more than 7 (on average 137:4 vs. 1; 009).
Moreover, the fact that max#k is much smaller than the actual number of received bids
holds for any single auction k.
As a consequence of the high number of bids, the auctioneer made positive prots in
every LUBA. A cautious estimate shows that prots per auction amount on average to the
441% of the retail price.15 The hypothesis of rational behavior is refuted by these ndings.
In fact, if bidders were rational and Va = V , auctioneers prots could be positive only if
the winning bid is very large.16 This is not what we observe in the data where winning
bids amount on average to just 0:33% of V .
Some other features of the data also noticeably stand out. First, and once more
14More precisely, with R = Nk
Nk 1 the function simplies to #k(Nk) = Nk
j
Vk
Nkc
k
. This function is
maximized by the (possibly multiple) Nk 2
n
Nk; :::;
j
Vk
c
ko
that minimizes

Vk
N
k
c
 
j
Vk
N
k
c
k
. At these
maxima max#k = #k (Nk ) =
j
Vk
c
k
.
15Despite knowing the market value of the goods, the number of bids received and the unitary cost of 2
Euros per bid, prots cannot be computed with certainty. In fact, the auctioneer o¤ers a welcome bonus
such that a users rst deposit of money is doubled. Therefore, some of the bids are virtually for free.
We adopt a conservative approach and we assume that a) only 75% of the bids generated actual revenues
and b) Va = V even though the alternative assumption Va < V is more likely to hold because of quantity
discounts and/or marketing reasons.
16Prots are bounded above by umaxa = N
maxc + x^ti   Va with x^ti 2 f1; :::; V   maxg. Given that
max  N 1
N2c
V R we have that umaxa  N 1N V R + x^ti   Va. If Va = V , umaxa is certainly negative for any
x^ti <
1
N
V R.
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contrary to what equilibrium analysis indicates (see propositions 1 and 2), the aggregate
frequencies of the bids are not monotonically decreasing. Figure 1 shows the distribution
of the 97; 225 bids that picked numbers belonging to the set f1; :::; 500g. Although a
decreasing trend is clearly recognizable, this is not monotonic. A closer look at the data
reveals the nature of the spikes that appear in Figure 1: bidders tend to overbid on odd
numbers. More precisely, 54; 230 bids (55:8%) are odd while only 42; 995 (44:2%) are even.
A normally approximated binomial test shows that this di¤erence is signicant at the 1%
level. In line with this tendency, 9 out of the 10 most frequent bids are odd.17
Figure 1: The aggregate pattern of bids.
The preference for odd numbers has an intuitive explanation. In a LUBA, players
want to submit bids that no one else chooses. Therefore, agents tend to submit bids that
they perceive to be original: odd numbers (excluding those whose trailing digit is 5) and,
even better, prime numbers. A similar behavior emerges also in the LUBAs studied by
Östling et al. (2009) and is analogous to the one rst described in Crawford and Iriberri
(2007) for what concerns Hide and Seek games. Notice that the aggregate result of such
a bidding strategy is quite paradoxical as agents end up converging on these peculiar
17The complete top ten list, with aggregate frequency in brackets, is the following: 1 (1,287), 11 (936),
17 (936), 3 (841), 13 (822), 111 (813), 23 (798), 7 (777), 2 (766), 27 (741). As a matter of comparison,
round numbers like 10, 20 and 100 attracted respectively 506, 498 and 471 bids.
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numbers. Indeed, the data show that submitting an odd bid is suboptimal as the large
majority of winning bids are even numbers (68 vs. 32, with the di¤erence being signicant
at 1% level).
Although our model of boundedly rational bidders (Section 3) is silent about this
tendency, the bias towards submitting odd bids is another piece of evidence that goes
against the hypothesis of perfect rationality. In particular such a bidding behavior seems
to be consistent with Level-k analysis (see Stahl and Wilson, 1995, and Costa-Gomes et
al., 2001): agents erroneously think to be smarter than the opponents and only perform a
limited number of steps of reasoning.18 Subject to the availability of individual data, we
let for future research a more careful formalization and empirical investigation of agents
bidding strategies.
5 Conclusions
The paper introduced and analyzed a peculiar selling mechanism that is becoming in-
creasingly popular over the Internet: lowest unique bid auctions (LUBAs) that allocate
valuable goods to the agent who submits the lowest bid that is not matched by any other
bid. We showed that if bidders are rational, a LUBA can be protable for the seller only
if his valuation of the good is much lower than the valuation of the potential buyers. But
we also showed why in reality this auction format is so successful: boundedly rational
bidders may lack the necessary commitment to stick to equilibrium strategies, and thus,
they may become locked in a costly war of attrition that highly rewards the auctioneer. In
particular, we highlighted how such a mechanism is driven by the existence of the signals
the auctioneer sends about the current status of playersbids. It is, therefore, ironic to
notice how websites that organize LUBAs overstress, surely a bit in bad faith, the alleged
positive role of these signals.19 While it is clear why they do so (they have to justify the
18Notice moreover that the data do not allow to control for the level of experience of the players. The
bias in submitting odd bids would probably be even more pronounced if only agents that play the game
for the rst few times were considered.
19For instance, one of these websites claims that Relying on these signals, using di¤erent strategies and
di¤erent levels of investment, to win the auction becomes a matter of a complex use of various abilities.
Another website declares: The investment, the signals and the bidding strategies make the auction void
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xed cost associated with each bid, and they want to distinguish themselves with respect
to pure lotteries and gambling), the paper showed that signals are at best a double-edged
weapon.
Lowest unique bid auctions also su¤er from other potential problems that should sug-
gest prudence. For instance, they share the technological hitches that characterize on
line auctions: problems of connectivity, delays or congestion, possibly due to last minute
bidding or sniping (see, for instance, Roth and Ockenfels, 2002 for the case of eBay
and Amazon auctions). Collusive behaviors are also an important issue. While collusion
among bidders seems unlikely due to the secrecy of agentsidentities and to problems of
coordination, collusion between the auctioneer and a single bidder looks much more easily
implementable. Bids are private information, but the auctioneer gets to know them in
real time. As such, nothing prevents him from indicating to a third party where to place
a winning bid seconds before the auction closes. Obviously, this would turn the auction
into a scam. We do not think that LUBAs are scams; the mechanism is too protable
to risk ruining it with such a trick. And indeed, to speak the truth, these websites put
quite some e¤ort in trying to build and maintain a reputation for being a trustable and
transparent outlet.
To sum up, lowest unique bid auctions are a very smart selling mechanism. On one
hand, by giving the possibility to win goods of considerable value for very little money,
they share the appeal of lotteries. On the other hand, they give bidders the illusion
of being in control of what they do, and they convey the idea that winning is just a
matter of being smarter than the others. The combination of these two factors makes the
business successful and, in turn, explains the continuous entry in the industry. Entry will
surely stimulate competition and lead to better conditions for the players: lower bidding
fees, higher welcome bonuses, and lower number of opponents. Nevertheless, the basic
mechanism underlying the auction format will remain the same such that the analysis of
this paper continues to be valid. We conclude by stressing once more the similarities that
lowest unique bid auctions have with other well-known games like the War of Attrition and
of any element of luck and based exclusively on the bidders ability.
24
the Dollar Auction Game. It is obviously not a coincidence that these games are used as
archetypes for describing situations where irrational behavior leads to an ine¢ cient waste
of resources.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Each agent i solves max
!i
E (ui) =

!Ri
!Ri +
P
j 6=i !
R
j

V   !i. This leads to the following
necessary and su¢ cient conditions:
@E (ui)
@!i
=
0B@ R!R 1i Pj 6=i !Rj
!Ri +
P
j 6=i !
R
j
2
1CAV   1 = 0
@2E (ui)
@!2i
=
0B@ R!R 2i Pj 6=i !Rj
!Ri +
P
j 6=i !
R
j
3
24(R  1)
0@!Ri +X
j 6=i
!Rj
1A  2R!Ri
35
1CAV < 0
Imposing symmetry (!i = !j = !), these become
@E (ui)
@!i
(!i = !j) =
 
(N   1)R!R 1!R
(N!R)2
!
V   1 = 0
@2E (ui)
@!2i
(!i = !j) =
 
R!2R 2 (N   1)
(N!R)3

(R  1)  N!R  2R!R!V < 0
The FOC yields the solution
! =
N   1
N2
V R
for which the SOC holds locally for R < NN 2 . By substituting the optimal ! within
the expected utility, we get that
E0(ui) =
1
N
V   N   1
N2
V R
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which is positive, such that bidders enter the game, for R < NN 1 .
20 This upper bound
is more restrictive that the constraint identied by the SOC. Therefore, by combining the
requirement of increasing returns to scale with this upper bound, we get R 2

1; NN 1

.
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